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events that led to mediation, explains the emergency measures that were needed to maintain law and 
order, and indicates the remaining problems that still need to be solved.  
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Kenya after the 2007 “Post-Election Violence” 
Miwa TSUDA 
 
Abstract 
Immediately after the announcement of the re-election of President Kibaki on the 
evening of 30 December 2007, Kenya was thrust into the worst civil unrest 
experienced by the country since independence – a development that became known 
as the “Post-Election Violence” (PEV). However, after a subsequent process of 
reconciliation, the PEV came to an end within a relatively short period. The present-
day politics of Kenya are being conducted within the framework of a provisional 
Constitution that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to 
put a lid on a period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This 
paper traces the sequence of events that led to mediation, explains the emergency 
measures that were needed to maintain law and order, and indicates the remaining 
problems that still need to be solved. 
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Introduction 
Early on the morning of 27 December 2007, a day of nation-wide elections in Kenya, 
the usual long queues of voters had already formed in front of the polling stations. 
Among the Kenyans waiting to cast their votes were many with memories of the 
defeat meted out in the election of 2002 to an administration that had ruled the country 
since independence. Many of those waiting to vote, moreover, were implicitly 
confident in the role of elections as a means of supervising and monitoring the 
performance of national government. In some people’s minds, almost certainly, was 
the defeat in a referendum held in 2005 of the government’s notorious proposals for a 
new constitution. Confident that elections formed a well-established feature of the 
democratic process, Kenyans waited to vote, many with the above thoughts running 
through their minds. 
However, any optimistic hopes that voters may have entertained were dashed three 
days later when, on the evening of 30 December, in the midst of mounting suspicions 
of vote rigging, the re-election of President Kibaki was formally announced (Kibaki is 
a Kikuyu, and at the time of the election he was the presidential candidate of the Party 
of National Unity, or PNU). Immediately after the announcement, Kenya was thrust 
into the worst civil unrest the country had experienced since independence – a 
development that became known as the “Post-Election Violence” (hereafter referred to 
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as PEV). To begin with, the violence was associated with the discontent that erupted 
over fear that the election results may have been rigged, and that Raila Odinga (a Luo 
and presidential candidate of the Orange Democratic Movement, or ODM) might have 
been robbed of his rightful election victory. Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and the other 
major cities of Kenya were the main centres of the unrest. In rural areas, violence 
against the Kikuyu (Kibaki’s ethnic group) broke out with arson attacks and killings, 
while in retaliation, groups claiming to be Kikuyu youth organizations – the so-called 
Mungiki – launched revenge attacks against non-Kikuyu people in rural districts of the 
Rift Valley as well as in Nairobi. 
The author received many heartrending reports over her cellular phone from Kikuyu 
families telling her how they had chosen to sleep outside because of their fears of 
arson attacks on their homes. As the unrest grew, the security forces blocked the main 
roads that ran through Nairobi, while elsewhere  newly organized vigilantes, acting on 
their own initiative, threw up barriers across the roads to screen traffic for “hostile 
communities”. As a result, the circulation of traffic came to a complete halt. In urban 
areas, food shortages occurred and there was a rapid escalation in the prices of daily 
necessities such as milk, bread and vegetables. Pre-paid cards for cell phones 
disappeared from the shops. The author found herself unable to make contact with 
Kikuyu families in both Mombasa and Nairobi.  The violence, the most severe and 
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widespread since independence, continued at a quickening pace. Over a thousand 
people died, and at its height, the figure for homeless refugees exceeded 600,000.1 
However, within a relatively short period, a process of reconciliation was able to bring 
the PEV to an end (at least when judged by external appearances). Kenya’s present-
day politics are being conducted within the framework of a provisional Constitution 
that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to put a lid on a 
period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This paper, written 
in January 2010, was put together less than two years after the upheaval that followed 
the 2007 election, and in the midst of a somewhat fluid reality. It traces the sequence 
of events that led to mediation, explains the emergency measures needed for the 
maintenance of law and order (as of the time of writing) and indicates the remaining 
problems that still need to be solved. 
 
1.  The path to mediation 
Kibaki and Odinga, the two rival contenders for power, clashed head on from the day 
that violence erupted. On 30 December, Kibaki forced through a presidential 
swearing-in ceremony in an attempt to solidify his position as the declared winner. For 
their part, the Odinga side held a press conference immediately after the ceremony, 
                                                          
1 For a detailed account of the Post-Election Violence, see Tsuda (2009). 
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and while making allegations of misconduct in the way that the election results had 
been calculated, indicated that they themselves would hold a swearing-in ceremony in 
which Odinga would be declared president. Thereafter the PEV continued unabated 
into January 2008.  
Details came out of an incident in the Rift Valley in which over 30 women and 
children, mainly Kikuyu, had taken refuge inside a church which was then attacked 
and set alight, killing everyone inside (BBC News, 2 January 2008). In all, the number 
of reported deaths increased to several hundred per week. 
Despite the worsening violence and the mounting suspicion of election vote rigging by 
the government, on 7 January Kibaki made it clear that the Tenth Parliament would be 
convened,2 and on 8 January he appointed seventeen cabinet members from his own 
faction, including the ministers for finance, defence, internal security, and justice. The 
Kibaki faction showed no sign of making any concessions whatsoever. Odinga and his 
supporters, meanwhile, made it clear that as a precondition for their cooperation in a 
mediation meeting,  Kibaki had to resign. On 9 January, John Kufuor, head of the 
African Union (AU) at the time, attempted to arrange meetings with Kibaki and 
Odinga in an effort to mediate between the two men. His initiative failed. 
                                                          
2 Power to convene the parliament rested exclusively with the president. 
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In the end, the body that succeeded in arranging mediation was the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities, headed by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the 
United Nations and the Panel’s chairman. Annan arrived in Kenya on 22 January and 
set up the panel with himself as chairman and assisted by two eminent members – 
Benjamin Mkapa (former president of Tanzania) and the world-famous activist and 
international advocate of women’s and children’s rights, Graça Machel, wife of 
Nelson Mandela, then South Africa’s president. These three persons were joined by 
four representatives from Kibaki’s PNU and four from Odinga’s ODM, thus 
establishing an organization known as the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR) committee.  
Thereafter, the KNDR pursued negotiations through a series of meetings which 
explored the possibilities for compromise between the PNU and the ODM camps. As 
Kenya grew increasingly ungovernable, the meetings of the KNDR provided the only 
forum for conducting mediation between the two sides. 
On 24 January 2008, encouraged by Annan, and in front of a large press conference, 
Kibaki and Odinga shook hands. By 1 February, agreement had been reached under 
KNDR auspices on a broad plan for ending the violence and for achieving 
rehabilitation. Specifically, this entailed Agendas One to Three, under which steps 
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would be taken to end the political crisis within a short period of between seven and 
fifteen days. Agenda Four was devoted to the resolution of longer term problems.  
The immediate focus of the mediation effort was to find a short-term resolution of the 
political crisis, and this lay in two issues: a temporary sharing of power between 
Kibaki and Odinga, and the introduction of amendments to the Constitution to make 
this power sharing possible. Midway through February, the Odinga side withdrew its 
insistence that Kibaki should resign (see Daily Nation, issue of 19 February 2008), but 
the Kibaki side found it difficult to reach agreement because of its insistence on 
maintaining the present Constitution unchanged.  
On 14 February, as part of the short-term agenda for settling the issue over the 
outcome of the 2007 presidential election, it was agreed to set up an independent 
review committee whose membership would include foreigners as well as Kenyans. 
This committee, it was finally agreed, should issue recommendations without delay 
with a view to reaching mutual agreement on a comprehensive reform of the electoral 
system. 
 
2. Towards a resolution of the political crisis 
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At the end of February, the Kibaki side yielded and made concessions. On 28 February 
2008, Kibaki and Odinga at long last  reached an agreement to establish a coalition 
government consisting of the PNU,  the ODM, and associated political parties. One of 
the key agreements between the two leaders was the establishment of the post of Prime 
Minister which, it was agreed, was to be taken by Odinga. They also agreed to bring 
about other necessary political changes including amendments of the Constitution that 
would make possible the establishment of a coalition government. Kibaki and Odinga 
formally signed the agreement in the presence of Kofi Annan and the other members 
of the Panel of Eminent Personalities. 
From this point onwards the PEV began to end. In the Tenth  Parliament, which 
convened on 6 March 2008, the members of parliament who were present 
unanimously approved the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2008 and passed 
the National Accord and Reconciliation Bill, 2008, that gave substance to the power 
sharing arrangements that Kibaki and Odinga had agreed on. Having been duly signed 
by the president, the Bill became the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008. 
The parliament that reconvened on 6 March reflected the anticipated coalition between 
the PNU and the ODM. Kibaki, the leader of the PNU, became the first president of 
Kenya to take his seat among the members of parliament as leader of the government 
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party next to Odinga, leader of the ODM.3 The vice president (a member of the ODM-
Kenya, a party associated with the PNU) ) who had occupied the place next to Kibaki, 
surrendered his seat to Odinga and moved to a seat that had been occupied by a 
member  of the opposition parties. Meanwhile MPs from both the PNU and the ODM 
sat not in party groups, as hitherto, but amongst each other, a development indicative 
of the mood of reconciliation prevailing in parliament. 
In this setting, the amended Constitution and the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Act provided the framework for the provisional coalition government. Let us now 
examine in brief the contents of the framework. According to the Constitution of  
Kenya ( Amendment) Act of 2008 (section 15A [6]), should there be a conflict of 
regulations between the National Accord and Reconciliation Act and the contents of 
the Constitution, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act should take precedence. 
Moreover, as regards the sections of the  Constitution dealing with the office of vice 
president, the amended Constitution contained regulations relevant to the new 
positions of prime minister and deputy prime minister (section 15A). It was further 
made clear that matters such as the appointment, dismissal, functions and powers of 
the prime minister and deputy prime minister, and the rules of establishing  the 
coalition government, would be determined by a law passed by parliament (the 
                                                          
3 The President of Kenya usually sits in a chair next to the Speaker of the Parliament.  
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National Accord and Reconciliation Act). It was also made clear that as regards the 
composition of the cabinet, the prime minister and the deputy prime minister would 
automatically be members of cabinet (section 17). 
The support of over 65 percent of all the members of parliament is needed to approve 
the amendment of Kenya’s Constitution. This is far more stringent than that needed to 
change other national laws. The latter  can be changed  by a vote of over half of the 
parliament members present. In this regard, by amending the Constitution, the contents 
of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act were written into the Constitution to 
preserve the contents of the agreement signed on 28 February 2008. The preservation 
of the Act by amending the Constitution itself also had been agreed to as part of the 
accord between Kibaki and Odinga on 28 February. 
Until early 2008 the legal system in Kenya contained no explicit regulations 
concerning coalition government and the president had the right to appoint and dismiss 
cabinet ministers and the vice president. These features could not be retained 
unchanged after the accord of 28 February, and the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act necessitated the introduction of some temporary but detailed 
provisions. Three of these were especially important. First, the Act stipulates that the 
prime minister is the leader of the party with the largest number of members in 
parliament; second, the deputy prime ministers are chosen by each of the parties that 
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make up the coalition; and third, the heads of the parties that make up the coalition 
nominate the members of the cabinet. Moreover the composition of the cabinet reflects 
the relative parliamentary strengths of the coalition member parties in parliament. That 
said, in appointing cabinet ministers, not just party representation but also the 
importance of particular ministerial portfolios must be taken into account. Under the 
terms of the amended Constitution, the power of the president to appoint and dismiss 
cabinet ministers became purely nominal. That power is no longer vested in the 
president, and the president no longer retains his right to unilaterally appoint and 
dismiss members of the government. Instead, changes in the composition of the 
cabinet are made on the basis of a written agreement and signed, following prior 
consultation, by the head of the coalition party that has nominated the concerned 
minister  and by the president.  
Moreover, the amended  Constitution and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 
make it clear that the prime minister is not simply a minister who takes his orders from 
the president, but has the authority to co-ordinate and supervise the execution of the 
government, including the work of the ministries . Regarding the dissolution of the 
coalition government, it was agreed that such action can occur only in the following 
circumstances, namely, at the time when the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or when 
the parties that make up the coalition agree in writing to a dissolution; or when one 
coalition partner withdraws from the coalition by a resolution of the highest decision-
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making organ of that party and confirms the withdrawal in writing. It was also agreed 
that the National Accord and Reconciliation Act can expire in only one of the 
following three circumstances, depending on which comes first: in the event of the 
Tenth Parliament being dissolved; in the event of the coalition being disbanded; or in 
the event of a new Constitution being formally promulgated. 
Relatively swift progress was made in implementing the above drastic legal changes. 
In April 2008 the coalition cabinet was formed with Kibaki as president, Odinga as 
prime minister, and with appointees of the PNU and the ODM serving as the 
respective deputy prime ministers (the PNU man was the leader of the KANU (Kenya 
African National Union), a PNU-associated party). However in order to allay 
differences of opinion over the distribution of cabinet positions, eight new ministerial 
posts had to be created, and the membership of the new cabinet, including the 
president, the prime minister, the two deputy prime ministers, and the various 
ministers and assistant ministers, expanded to no less than 94 individuals, equivalent 
to over 40 percent of the 222-strong membership of the parliament. Not surprisingly, 
keeping the coalition intact and preserving its maneuverability became major 
preoccupations. Nevertheless, thanks to the various changes outlined above, a political 
crisis in Kenya was successfully avoided. 
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3. Radical changes in the electoral system 
On 4 March 2008 agreements were reached between Kibaki’s PNU and Odinga’s 
ODM on the need for an enquiry into the circumstances underlying the accusations of 
vote rigging in the 2007 presidential election and into the need for a thorough change 
in the electoral system. It was also agreed that there should be a comprehensive 
revision of the Constitution as well as an investigation into the PEV, to include 
recommendations for dealing with the perpetrators of the violence. It was further 
agreed to set up a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. Kofi Annan had 
strongly recommended that the PEV be investigated, and that a Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation Commission be established. One of the points in this area of enquiry 
was the involvement of politicians in the instigation of the violence, but because of the 
fluidity of the situation at the time of writing, this topic will have to be left for a later 
paper.4 
First, let us consider the radical changes that occurred in the electoral system. In 
March 2008, Kibaki appointed the South African senior judge Johan Kriegler to head 
an eight-member independent commission of enquiry (hereafter the Kriegler 
Commission) to investigate the electoral process that was in operation at the time of 
the 2007 election. The Kriegler Commission presented its report on schedule in mid-
                                                          
3 For developments up to this point, see the paper by Matsuda (2010). 
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September 2008. The report’s main conclusion was that it was not clear who had won 
the 2007 presidential election. Parliament unanimously endorsed the report’s 
conclusion in December 2008 and thus the argument concerning the identity of the 
presidential election’s victor formally ceased to exist, confirming the legitimacy of the 
coalition government with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister. The 
general  elections of 2007 had been organized by the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK, whose chairman and members were appointed by the president). The Kriegler 
Commission recommended the wholesale reorganization of the ECK. On 1 October 
2008, only a few weeks after the submission of the Kriegler Commission report, the 
then the ECK  chairman announced his effective resignation, and at the end of October, 
a cabinet committee was organized with the aim of carrying out the Kriegler 
Commission’s proposals. It was agreed to dissolve the ECK and to set up a provisional 
electoral administration committee.  
When the related bill came up for approval in parliament, following a detailed 
discussion of how best to make appointments to the provisional electoral 
administration committee, agreement was reached, and in December 2008, the 
proposed amendment of the Constitution to enable the dissolution of the ECK was 
approved in a vote by 169 MPs.  
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With the amendment of the Constitution, an Interim Independent Election 
Commission of Kenya (IIEC), immune from the erstwhile power of the president to 
appoint and dismiss commission members, was set up along with an Interim 
Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC). As their titles indicate, the 
IIEC and the IIBRC were established as temporary bodies. Section 41 (13) of the 
amended Constitution made it clear that both the IIEC and the IIBRC should be 
regarded as dissolved twenty four months after commencement of the amended 
Constitution or three months after the promulgation of a new Constitution, whichever 
being the earlier. Initially, the IIEC experienced a rough passage that was related to 
controversial personnel appointments, but in due course the IIEC and the IIBRC 
settled down to work, and have survived until the present day. 
 
4. Towards the enactment of a new Constitution 
In the “National Dialogue and Reconciliation” agreement, it was recognized that as 
well as dealing with the causes of the PEV, it was necessary to address key issues of a 
long-standing nature identified on 1 February 2008 (issues that lay within the remit of 
“Agenda Four”) and to proceed towards the enactment of a new Constitution. The 
final accord of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, on 4 March 2008, 
called for a) the setting up, within a period of eight weeks of the meeting, of a legally 
16 
 
binding timetable for a review of the Constitution; b) the completion of this review 
within a year of the publication of the timetable; and c) the holding of a national 
referendum to approve proposals for a new Constitution. 
Thereafter, progress lagged behind schedule, and in November 2008 parliament passed 
the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2008, which made provision for the formation 
of an expert committee to steer the process of constitutional revision and which 
involved a detailed schedule for the period up to the national referendum. 
Members of the Committee of Experts, a body created according to the regulations of 
the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008), were appointed via parliamentary 
recommendation and comprised three non-Kenyans and six Kenyans (the chairman, 
Nzamba Kitonga, was a senior lawyer and a Kenyan). In November 2009, this 
committee published the Harmonized Draft Constitution, based on the main drafts that 
had been made hitherto. 
At the time of writing (January 2010), the Committee of Experts, having obtained 
communications and proposals from all over the country, had forwarded its revised 
draft to a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). After the PSC has given its views to 
the Committee of Experts, the draft will have to be further amended before being sent 
forward for consideration by parliament. It is possible for parliament to propose 
changes to the Committee of Experts’ draft, but approval of a proposed change to the 
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draft would require the support of not just a simple majority of the members of 
parliament present but of over 65 percent of all the parliament members (see Section 
47A of the Constitution).5 
If parliament agrees to a revision of the Harmonized Draft Constitution by a 65% 
majority, the Committee of Experts again revises the draft and re-submits it. 
Thereafter, apart from technical changes, the draft cannot be altered. Although the 
attitude of parliament towards the draft Constitution cannot be predicted with certainty, 
the outlook is for the final draft to be submitted by parliament to the attorney-general 
sometime during the first half of 2010. Within a period of 30 days following receipt of 
the draft, the attorney-general will submit the bill for a new Constitution of Kenya and 
                                                          
5  This procedure was introduced at the time of the amendment of the Constitution on 29 December 
2008 (which also established the IIEC and the IIBRC as mentioned above). The procedure was adopted 
in wake of the experience of the 2005 referendum on a draft constitution. In 2005, a national-level 
meeting of representatives of the government and opposition parties and of NGOs examined a draft for 
a new constitution (which was known as the “Bomas Draft”) that won widespread agreement. The 
Bomas Draft tried to  reduce the power of the president drastically. However, political maneuvering by 
those supporting the president and who were anxious to avoid this dilution of power resulted in 
changing the contents of the Bomas Draft to maintain the power of the president. Because the then 
“Constitution of Kenya Review Act” and Constitution of Kenya had no special clauses protecting the 
Bomas Draft, changing clauses of the Draft was possible with a simple majority of the parliamentary 
members present. 
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within 60 days of the issuance, and by way of the IIEC, the new Constitution will be 
put to the people of Kenya in a national referendum.6 
As of 1January 2010 (the time of writing), the draft Constitution prepared by the 
Committee of Experts incorporates contents of the Bomas Draft of 2005, and contains 
a number of key elements such as the establishment of the executive post of prime 
minister, a substantial reduction in the power of the president, and the decentralization 
of government through a binary system and a devolved government consisted of 
national and county governments. If the new Constitution is enacted, its introduction 
will signify the achievement of a substantial change from the framework of the 
previous Constitution of Kenya. However the future of the proposals cannot be 
predicted with certainty. As has been pointed out above, the IIEC’s term of office 
expires at the end of December 2010 at the latest, and if the process for establishing 
the new Constitution runs out of time, yet more revisions of the current Constitution 
will become necessary. At the time of writing, it is not yet possible to be wholly 
optimistic about whether or not the contents of the draft Constitution will take into 
                                                          
6 A revision of the Constitution that came into effect in December 2008 laid down a new rule for 
interpreting the results of the referendum, namely that the proposed new constitutional draft had to be 
approved by not only over half of the votes cast in the referendum, but also by over 25 percent of the 
votes cast in five of the eight provinces of Kenya. 
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account the dilution of presidential power, nor even about whether the new 
Constitution will actually be promulgated. 
 
Conclusion 
Even though developments are running somewhat behind the planned schedule, Kenya 
after the PEV can be said to have succeeded in escaping from the political dangers that 
confronted it in early 2008. Among the accomplishments are the inauguration of the 
coalition government, with Kibaki as the President and Odinga as the Prime Minister, 
the dissolution of the ECK, and the setting up of the IIEC and the IIBRC. 
Unfortunately, however, all of these changes amount to little more than temporary 
expedients. As we have seen, Kenya managed to put a lid on the period of turmoil that 
followed the elections of December 2007. But as has been made clear, that lid 
consisted of the constitutional amendment of 2008 and the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act of the same year. Both of these measures will shortly expire – in 
other words the lid will soon cease to do the job that it was designed for – and what 
happens then is impossible to predict.  
Moreover, no one can predict what will happen after the IIEC’s tenure expires at the 
end of December 2010, and after the Tenth Parliament reaches the date of mandatory 
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dissolution. Even the enactment of the crucially important  new Constitution cannot be 
taken for granted. 
More than anything else, the memories of the killing and maiming that arose out of 
suspicions of vote rigging in the 2007 election, and of the reversion to the ethnic 
question of “Are you, or are you not a Kikuyu?”, will not easily disappear. Moreover, 
for the refugees who cannot at present return to their homes, the problem is not so 
much one of “memories” as of fear and mistrust of progress – a feeling that originated 
in the mayhem that followed the election. Directly caught up in that issue is the very 
slow pace – slow to the point of serious delay – of the work of both the Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission, and the CIPEV, a body set up on the 
recommendation of the Independent Review Commission to enquire into the PEV.7 
Old acquaintances, still homeless after the PEV, have told the author that “the 
criminals who attacked our houses and burned us out of our homes are still living on 
the land that belongs to us. There has been no apology. How can this be allowed? 
When the next election comes round there will be even worse trouble.” 
“Kenya is on the way to becoming a failed state.” “There will be worse trouble in the 
next election.”  “2007 was an exception in that the unrest was a prepared unrest.” 
                                                          
7 The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence is often abbreviated to the Waki Commission. 
For details, see Matsuda (2010). 
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These are some of the opinions of Kenyan intellectuals who are still sharply divided in 
their views. Should the “2007 post-election violence” be understood as a “one off” 
event that was successfully contained? In fact, two hurdles still have to be overcome to 
achieve a lasting settlement. The first is the planned national referendum on the new 
Constitution. The second, and it is a hurdle of very great importance, is the next 
general elections scheduled for the end of 2012. Kenyan politics is setting out across a 
wasteland that was created by the great unrest that followed the 2007 election. The 
challenge is a substantial one, but it behoves everyone, us researchers included, to 
avoid viewing the government’s problems with a pessimism that may prove excessive. 
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